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ETHICS CASE 
Disclosing Information about the Risk of Inherited Disease 
Commentary by Clint Parker, MD, PhD 
 
Mrs. Durham was diagnosed with an invasive epithelial ovarian cancer and, in 
conjunction with conversations about her treatment, was offered genetic testing for the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations. It was revealed that she carried a harmful BRCA1 
mutation that is known to increase the lifetime risk of breast and ovarian cancer 
significantly. Once the results came back, her oncologist brought up the option of a 
prophylactic mastectomy and advised her to inform her living relatives of the results of 
the test. 
 
Mrs. Durham’s primary care physician, Dr. Bartlett, expected she would do so, too. At her 
first appointment after the diagnosis, Dr. Bartlett asked Mrs. Durham how she was 
holding up and how her sister, Mrs. Weir—her only living family member and also one of 
Dr. Bartlett’s patients—had taken the news. 
 
“Oh. Well, I haven’t told her.” 
 
“Are you going to?” asked Dr. Bartlett. 
 
Mrs. Durham responded, “You know we haven’t spoken in quite some time, and I can’t 
imagine making this the topic of our first conversation.” 
 
“Yes, I know…but I think this is important information that may affect her health.” 
 
Mrs. Durham sighed. “We’re estranged, for one thing, and for another, I want to keep my 
cancer private. I don’t want people knowing I’m sick and pitying me.” 
 
Dr. Bartlett felt pulled in two directions—his obligation to respect Mrs. Durham’s wishes 
and protect her privacy conflicted with his obligation to promote Mrs. Weir’s health. 
BRCA1 mutations are not “reportable” illnesses like HIV and tuberculosis, so he was not 
compelled by law to break Mrs. Durham’s confidentiality. Dr. Bartlett considered how he 
might be able to encourage Mrs. Durham’s sister to be tested for the BRCA mutations 
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Commentary 
In our case, Dr. Bartlett appears to have a professional obligation to keep Mrs. Durham’s 
private medical information confidential. He also appears to have an obligation to 
prevent harm to Mrs. Durham’s sister, Mrs. Weir, who is also his patient. Because her 
sister has the BRCA1 mutation, there is an increased likelihood of Mrs. Weir’s also 
carrying it, and, if she does, there is increased risk of harm from breast and ovarian 
cancer that could be reduced through prophylactic operations and aggressive screening. 
Therefore, Dr. Bartlett appears to have an obligation to counsel Mrs. Weir about her 
possible increased risk of cancer, about diagnostic testing that could verify whether she 
actually has this increased risk, and, if she does have the mutation and the concomitant 
increased risk of cancer that comes with it, about the therapeutic options available to her 
to decrease this risk. 
 
On the face of it, it seems that Dr. Bartlett is confronted with an ethical dilemma. A true 
ethical dilemma involves competing moral obligations that cannot both be fulfilled and 
may take the following form: Person A has a moral obligation to do act X and act Y, but 
cannot do both X and Y simultaneously. In our case it seems that Dr. Bartlett must either 
protect Mrs. Durham’s confidentiality or break this confidence to try to decrease the risk 
of a bad outcome for her sister. 
 
Whether one considers ethical dilemmas real depends on what ethical theory one 
accepts. Some ethical theories are structurally monistic, that is, they assert that any 
moral choice can, in theory, be adjudicated by one overarching moral rule and that what 
appears to be a dilemma is not. Act consequentialism is a theory that functions in this 
way [1]: the right action in any given case is that act which, among the possible acts an 
agent could pursue, would bring about the best balance of good over bad 
consequences—however one defines good or bad consequences. 
 
Most approaches to moral decision making in modern bioethics, however, are not 
monistic. Rather, it is common in modern bioethics to assume a pluralistic framework—
one in which multiple, competing moral claims do not simply reduce to an overarching 
moral claim [2, 3]. Unlike in monistic systems, in some pluralistic systems, moral 
dilemmas can arise [4]. 
 
In pluralistic systems, there are at least three different ways of thinking about conflicts 
between moral claims. First, one can take an optimistic view and hold that as long as one 
fulfills at least one of the competing moral obligations, one has acted rightly. So, as long 
as Dr. Bartlett either keeps Mrs. Durham’s information confidential or breaks 
confidentiality for the good reason of counseling her sister regarding her possible 
increased risk of cancer, he has done what is right. Alternatively, one can take a 
pessimistic view and hold that as long as one has failed to fulfill one of the competing 
moral obligations, one has acted wrongly. This would present a true ethical dilemma; 
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regardless of whether Dr. Bartlett keeps Mrs. Durham’s medical information confidential 
or breaks confidentiality in order to counsel her sister, he has acted wrongly. However, 
there is a third way to think about conflicts between competing moral claims that does 
not assume each moral consideration to be an actual moral obligation. 
 
In this third approach, individual moral considerations, each of which is considered to 
have some degree of moral force when viewed in isolation, are called prima facie moral 
obligations [5]. The job of the moral agent is to balance the competing prima facie moral 
obligations and come up with an all-things-considered (ATC) judgment about what to do in 
a given case. Prima facie obligations can be thought of as wrong-making or right-making 
properties. For example, the act “Dr. Bartlett divulges Mrs. Durham’s confidential 
information” can fall under different act descriptions. It can be described as an act of 
“breaking confidentiality,” and it can also be described as an act of “preventing harm.” 
Thus the same act has two moral properties—the wrong-making property of violating a 
prima facie obligation to maintain patient confidentiality and the right-making property of 
fulfilling a prima facie obligation to prevent harm. 
 
The ATC judgment is an intuitive act of moral reasoning in which we consider all of the 
right- and wrong-making properties of the act and then judge whether the act is actually 
wrong, morally required, or permissible. It is this judgment that is ultimately action 
guiding, and it is these properties (i.e., wrongness or obligatoriness) that ultimately 
provide warrant for moral attitudes such as blame and praise. On this view, prima facie 
obligations are not actual obligations and, therefore, cannot lead to a true ethical 
dilemma. That is, taken individually, they do not necessarily obligate us. They are ways of 
describing the right- and wrong-making properties of acts that then must be weighed 
against one another to determine whether the act is actually morally required or 
prohibited. We may use the term obligation in prima facie obligations because if there is 
only one morally relevant description of an act, then the prima facie obligation 
exemplified by that act description would determine the rightness or wrongness of the 
act, which would then actually obligate us. 
 
For our case, I will adopt this third approach, and our task will be to see which of the 
possible actions available to us is the right thing to do, given our prima facie obligation to 
keep Mrs. Durham’s private medical information confidential and our prima facie 
obligation to counsel Mrs. Weir in order to prevent possible harm. 
 
Analysis of This Case 
There are at least four different actions that Dr. Bartlett could take. First, he could simply 
not counsel Mrs. Weir regarding her possible increased risk of cancer. Second, he could 
break confidentiality, tell Mrs. Weir that Mrs. Durham tested positive for the BRCA1 
mutation, counsel her regarding her own risk of carrying the mutation, and recommend 
getting tested. Third, he could try to convince Mrs. Durham to tell her sister about her 
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positive BRCA1 test or, at least, to give him permission to do so. Finally, Dr. Bartlett could 
simply advise Mrs. Weir that he believes that she is at risk for the BRCA1 mutation and 
should get tested for it. If she asks why, then he could inform her that, while he is not at 
liberty to disclose all of the details of why he believes she is at increased risk, he has 
come to that conclusion and would like for her to trust that he is acting in her best 
interest. 
 
I will argue against the first two approaches and for a combination of the last two 
approaches. The main ethical consideration that supports counseling Mrs. Weir to get 
tested is that physicians have a prima facie obligation to try to prevent disease from 
harming their patients. By not counseling Mrs. Weir about her possible increased risk of 
the BRCA1 mutation, Dr. Bartlett would be depriving her of information she needs to 
make a decision about tests and procedures that might help reduce her risk of cancer. 
However, if Dr. Bartlett simply told Mrs. Weir that Mrs. Durham had cancer and tested 
positive for the BRCA1 mutation, then he would be violating the competing prima facie 
obligation to keep Mrs. Durham’s medical information confidential. 
 
Certainly, if Mrs. Durham told her sister herself or consented to allowing Dr. Bartlett to 
share this information with her sister, that would allow Dr. Bartlett to act in a way that 
did not violate patient confidentiality and would likewise allow him to fulfill his prima 
facie obligation to try to prevent harm to Mrs. Weir. It would be morally acceptable for Dr. 
Bartlett to have an open and honest discussion with Mrs. Durham about why he would 
want to share this information with her sister, offer a moral argument for why this would 
be appropriate, and make a direct recommendation such as, “I think you should allow me 
to share this information with your sister because it may help her make decisions that 
could decrease her risk of getting cancer.” 
 
Let’s assume that, for whatever reason, Mrs. Durham again refuses. Whatever one may 
think about the moral propriety of her action, Dr. Bartlett would still have a prima facie 
moral obligation to keep her information confidential. One could argue that, since the 
obligation is only prima facie, it should be overridden by the prima facie obligation to try to 
prevent harm—especially if Mrs. Durham cannot articulate any good reasons for keeping 
the information confidential. However, in this case, I think that another option is available 
to Dr. Bartlett that would allow him to keep Mrs. Durham’s information confidential and 
prevent harm to Mrs. Weir. He could meet with Mrs. Weir and simply recommend that 
she get tested for the BRCA1 mutation. I could imagine the conversation going as 
follows: 
 
Dr. Bartlett: Mrs. Weir, I wanted to bring you in today to discuss something with you. I 
have recently come to believe that you may be at increased risk of breast and ovarian 
cancer due to possibly possessing a genetic mutation. I would like to get you tested, 
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because if you have this mutation there may be some things we can do to decrease your 
risk. The test involves obtaining a blood sample. 
 
Mrs. Weir: Dr. Bartlett, why do you think I might have this mutation? 
 
Dr. Bartlett: I am not at liberty to give you all the details of how I have come to believe 
that you might have this mutation, but I do think it is in your best interest if we had you 
tested. As your doctor I am asking you to trust me. 
 
Trust is a ubiquitous part of the patient-physician relationship. And, while respect for 
patient autonomy is an extremely important ethical consideration that plays a 
fundamental role in the patient-physician relationship, respect for patient autonomy 
does not eliminate the need for patients to trust physicians, and it does not eliminate the 
need for physicians to be worthy of that trust. Sometimes trust is needed because the 
patient may not be able to understand or have enough time to process the information 
to make a decision without relying heavily on the physician’s recommendation. In this 
case, trust is needed because the physician is trying to avoid violating a prima facie 
obligation to one patient while also trying to meet his prima facie obligation to prevent 
harm to another patient. 
 
At this point, one might object. What if Mrs. Weir surmises that her sister has the 
mutation and that this is why Dr. Bartlett wants to have her tested? Suppose Mrs. Weir 
asks Mrs. Durham if she has the mutation? I think that both are possible outcomes, but 
even if Mrs. Weir does come to the conclusion that her sister has the mutation, Dr. 
Bartlett has not violated Mrs. Durham’s confidentiality. He has not told Mrs. Weir 
anything about her sister’s condition. He has only used that information to help another 
one of his patients. And while I think a case can be made that Dr. Bartlett should not 
directly divulge or negligently expose Mrs. Durham’s personal health information to a 
third party, it is much harder to make the case that Dr. Bartlett should not use the 
information he has obtained to prevent a possible harm to a third party merely because 
doing so may increase the chances of that third party correctly surmising something 
about Mrs. Durham’s health condition. 
 
Suppose, for example, a college student contracts meningitis in a dorm and doesn’t want 
anyone to know that she has it. Would the college student’s desire to keep her health 
information private also preclude someone’s sending letters to her dormmates about 
their need to get prophylaxis, because they might be able to deduce who was originally 
infected? I don’t think so. The point here is that when one patient’s confidential medical 
information can be used to prevent a serious harm to a third party, the prima facie right 
to confidentiality must be balanced against the prima facie obligation that the physician 
has to prevent serious harm to that third party. And while patients have a strong prima 
facie right to expect that physicians will not directly disclose or negligently expose their 
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health information, the claim to a right that physicians do everything possible to prevent 
others from surmising on their own some detail about a patient’s health information is a 
far weaker claim. Suppose, for example, one patient sees another come to see an 
oncologist while in the waiting room and surmises that this person is being evaluated or 
treated for cancer. Are physicians obliged to prevent such occurrences? This seems to 
demand too much. 
 
When divulging confidential information to prevent harm to a third party, I believe 
physicians should be guided by two principles. First, the harm should be both likely and 
significant [6]. The prima facie right to a physician’s confidentiality is strong—the 
patient-physician relationship depends on it—and it takes a strong counterclaim to 
override it. Second, the physician should divulge only the information necessary for the 
third party to avoid the possible harm. Divulging other information would break 
confidentiality for no good reason. In our case, the potential harm is great and the 
amount of information that needs to be divulged can be minimized to the point that 
there is no direct disclosure of any of Mrs. Durham’s confidential information. 
 
In conclusion, Dr. Bartlett should talk to Mrs. Durham about why he believes it is 
important that her sister be tested and ask her to either tell her sister or allow him to 
discuss the positive BRCA1 test results with her sister. If Mrs. Durham refuses, Dr. 
Bartlett should reassure Mrs. Durham that he will not reveal to her sister that she has 
been diagnosed with ovarian cancer or with the BRCA1 mutation. He should then meet 
with Mrs. Weir, counsel her to get tested, and if she inquires why, inform her that he is 
not at liberty to say but would like for her to trust that he is trying to act in her best 
interest. This course of action would avoid violating Dr. Bartlett’s prima facie obligation to 
keep Mrs. Durham’s diagnosis confidential and fulfill his prima facie obligation to help 
prevent harm to Mrs. Weir. 
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